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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Stephen William Lundquist appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
verdict finding him guilty of first-degree stalking.  Lundquist claims the evidence 
was insufficient to support the verdict.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Lundquist with two counts of felony stalking involving 
Charlene Barrett in two separate cases, which were consolidated for trial.  (R., 
pp.10-11, 48-49, 179-184.)  The jury found Lundquist guilty of one count, but 
acquitted him of the other count.  (R., pp.264-265.)  Lundquist filed a “Post Trial 
I.C.R. 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,” which the district court denied.  (R., 
pp.267-272, 282.) After denying Lundquist’s motion for an acquittal, the court 
imposed a unified five-year sentence, with two years fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Lundquist on probation for five years.  (R., pp.282, 284-





 Lundquist states the issue on appeal as: 
Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the jury’s 
finding of guilt? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Do the applicable legal standards and the evidence presented at trial 
require this Court to reject Lundquist’s argument that the evidence was 








There Was Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial From Which The 
Jury Found Lundquist Guilty Of First-Degree Stalking 
 
A. Introduction 
 Lundquist challenges his conviction for first-degree stalking, claiming the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because, he argues, the state 
failed to prove (1) his “actions were knowing and malicious”; (2) he “engaged in 
repeated acts of nonconsensual conduct involving the alleged victim”; and (3) 
that his “conduct caused the victim to be seriously annoyed, alarmed, or 
harassed, or that his conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial 
emotional distress.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7 (brackets and some quotations 
omitted).)  All of Lundquist’s arguments fail.  Application of the correct legal 
standards to the evidence presented shows the state presented substantial 
competent evidence to prove every element of first-degree stalking beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Lundquist’s claims to the contrary are without merit.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997).  
In conducting this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of 
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, 
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Id.  Moreover, the 
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facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of 
upholding the jury’s verdict.  Id. 
 
C. Lundquist’s Claim That The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To 
Prove The Essential Elements Of Felony Stalking Is Contrary To The 
Evidence And The Law 
 
 The jury’s guilty verdict for first-degree stalking of Charlene was based on 
allegations related to Lundquist’s conduct “on or between October 2013 and 
January 2014.”   (R., pp.49, 249, 264.)  In order to find Lundquist guilty of this 
offense, the jury was required to find that the state met its burden of proving, inter 
alia, that Lundquist “knowingly and maliciously” “engaged in a course of 
conduct,” that “seriously alarmed annoyed or harassed” Charlene and “was such 
as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress.”  (ICJI 
1274A; see R., p.253 (elements instruction).)  “Course of conduct” is defined as 
“repeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim,” excluding 
“constitutionally protected activity.”  I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a).  “Nonconsensual 
contact” is in turn defined as “any contact with the victim that is initiated or 
continued without the victim’s consent, that is beyond the scope of the consent 
provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that 
the contact be avoided or discontinued.”  I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c).  “‘Nonconsensual 
contact’ includes, but is not limited to:” 
(i)  Following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by 
electronic means, on the victim; 
 
(ii) Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property; 
 





(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or 
occupied by the victim;  
 
(v) Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim’s 
telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of whether 
a conversation ensues;  
 
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to the victim; or 
 
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property 
owned, leased or occupied by the victim. 
 
I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(i)-(vii).1  Because Lundquist was charged with first-degree 
stalking, the jury also was required to find that “[t]he actions constituting the 
offense,” as defined above, were “in violation of a temporary restraining order, 
protection order, no contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof.”  I.C. 
§ 18-7905(1)(a).     
 Lundquist claims the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s 
findings that:  (1) his “actions were knowing and malicious”; (2) he “engaged in 
repeated acts of nonconsensual conduct involving” Charlene; and (3) his 
“conduct caused [Charlene] to be seriously annoyed, alarmed, or harassed, or 
that his conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional 
distress.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7 (brackets and some quotations omitted).)  
                                            
1 Although the district court instructed the jury on the definitions of “course of 
conduct” and “nonconsensual contact,” the court’s definitions deviated somewhat 
from the statutory definitions and the pattern instructions.  (Compare R., p.255 
with I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a), (c) and ICJI 1275.)  Most notably, the district court’s 
definition of “course of conduct” elaborated on the statutory definition by deleting 
the “constitutionally protected activity language” and including the clause “and 
occurring over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of 
purpose on the part of the defendant.”  (R., p.255.)  The district court’s list of 
examples of non-consensual conduct eliminated some of the descriptive 
language used in I.C. § 18-7906(c)(i), (ii), and (v), and completely omitted the 
examples set forth in I.C. § 18-7906(c)(iii), (iv), and (vii).      
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Lundquist’s arguments fail because they are contrary to the evidence and the 
law.   
 Lundquist first argues that the state failed to meet its burden of proof 
because, he claims, Charlene was “thoroughly impeached” at trial with respect to 
an incident where Charlene missed work on September 13, 2013, due to a panic 
attack and that, when she left the hospital the day she had her panic attack, her 
car would not start due to a dead battery and the emergency brake was engaged 
even though she did not set the brake.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.)  Charlene 
also testified, in the context of this incident, that she believed Lundquist may 
have been responsible and she believed Lundquist “put a GPS device on her 
vehicle.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  Lundquist argues:  “None of this was true, but 
[Charlene] did get her day off work.  There was no evidence of a GPS device.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  Lundquist also notes that even though Charlene 
testified “she told the police about every encounter with Mr. Lundquist, she 
admitted that she never mentioned the hospital incident to any of the police 
officers or in her application for a protection order.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  It is 
unclear how Lundquist’s belief, even if it were accurate, demonstrates a failure of 
proof on any of the elements he complains were not satisfied.  That Charlene 
reported she missed work due to a panic attack and thought Lundquist engaged 
in other conduct she did not report is irrelevant to whether the state presented 
sufficient evidence that Lundquist knowingly and maliciously engaged in a course 
of conduct as defined in I.C. § 18-7906.   
 
 7 
 Lundquist next compares his case to VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), which he appears to believe supports the proposition that 
there is no evidence in this case to support a finding of malicious intent.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  Neither the facts nor the holding of VanHorn 
support Lundquist’s argument.  The stalking statute at issue in VanHorn 
prohibited “harassment,” which was defined as “conduct directed toward a victim 
that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible contact 
that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress . . ..”  889 
N.E.2d at 910.  The court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not 
“impermissible” because it only involved being on a city street without prior notice 
that such conduct was prohibited.  Id. at 912-913.  As an example of “prior 
notice,” the court contrasted the facts of VanHorn with the facts of Waldon v. 
State, 684 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), in which the court upheld a stalking 
conviction where the victim saw the defendant “five times near the dance studio 
where she worked (once peering through the fence) and once in the parking lot 
of the hospital where she worked.”  VanHorn, 889 N.E.2d at 912 (citing Waldon, 
684 N.E.2d 206).  The court noted that, in Waldon, “the defendant and the victim 
had divorced and stipulated to a mutual restraining order.  Therefore, it had 
already been established that any contact between the defendant and the victim 
was impermissible.”  VanHorn, 889 N.E.2d at 912.  But, “[u]nlike Waldon, 
VanHorn had no notice of the impermissibility of his conduct.”  Id. 
 Like Waldon, but unlike VanHorn, Lundquist also had notice of the 
impermissibility of his conduct because he engaged in much of it after Charlene 
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successfully obtained a protection order that prohibited him from contacting 
Charlene and from going within 500 feet of Charlene, her residence, or her 
workplace (Macy’s).  (Exhibit 25.)   The fact that many of Lundquist’s prohibited 
acts occurred in public places does not, as Lundquist suggests, preclude a 
finding of malicious intent.  Not only does the stalking statute allow for 
consideration of actions in public places, I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(ii), it is well-
established, both in case law and in the Idaho Code, that intent may be inferred 
from the defendant’s conduct or from circumstantial evidence.  State v. Reyes, 
139 Idaho 502, 506, 80 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 2003); I.C. § 18-115.  The jury 
could easily infer the requisite intent from the evidence that Lundquist repeatedly 
called Charlene and repeatedly went to the same locations where Charlene was 
despite the existence of the protection order.  (See generally Tr., pp.167-264 
(Charlene’s testimony regarding Lundquist’s repeated acts of nonconsensual 
contact).)  The jury was also entitled to consider Lundquist’s conduct prior to the 
issuance of the protection order for purposes of determining Lundquist’s intent.  
(R., p.256.)  That conduct included Lundquist going to Charlene’s home, 
pounding on her door, giving her “the finger,” throwing rocks at her window, 
turning on the hose in Charlene’s yard in an apparent attempt to flood Charlene’s 
crawlspace, and going to Macy’s where Charlene worked and sitting on a couch 
and watching Charlene.  (Tr., p.170, L.24 – p.175, L.5, p.181, Ls.4-20.)  There 
was more than sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Lundquist 
knowingly and maliciously engaged in the conduct that formed the basis of the 
first-degree stalking charge. 
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 Also contrary to Lundquist’s argument, the state was not required to 
present evidence of any verbal, written, or physical threat in order to infer 
malicious intent.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  If such conduct were necessary for a 
stalking conviction, that requirement would be set forth in the statute; it is not.  To 
the contrary, the statutory definition of “nonconsensual contact,” and the statutory 
examples of what constitutes such contact, illustrate that stalking does not 
require a threat in order to sustain a conviction.  Lundquist’s claim otherwise fails.   
 Lundquist next argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence 
that he engaged in a course of conduct.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-13.)  More 
specifically, Lundquist offers individual explanations for some of his 
nonconsensual contacts after issuance of the protection order.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.12-13.)  For example, Lundquist asserts that the “ten-minute phone call on 
October 10th” was not nonconsensual because it lasted “for 10 minutes,” and he 
argues if Charlene “was annoyed or harassed by [his] texts or emails she could 
have easily blocked [his] number, but she did not.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  This 
argument ignores the law and the evidence.  Lundquist’s initiation of a phone 
call, which was prohibited by the protection order, is nonconsensual contact 
regardless of how long the phone call lasts.  Further, Charlene testified that when 
Lundquist called her in October 2013, she “begged him to quit calling,” to “leave 
[her] alone,” because the relationship was “over,” and she ultimately “hung up” on 
Lundquist after telling him not to “call [her] or come over.”  (Tr., p.201, L.6 – 
p.202, L.3.)  Lundquist, however, “called right back.”  (Tr., p.202, Ls.7-10.)  Under 
any reasonable view of the evidence, this telephone contact was nonconsensual.  
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Further, contrary to Lundquist’s claim, Charlene did ultimately “block” his number, 
at which point Lundquist began calling from “unidentified numbers.”  (Tr., p.203, 
Ls.1-12.)   
 Lundquist next claims the “couple of instances” where he came to the 
“same restaurant can be clearly explained as coincidental” because, he argues, 
they “all were places the parties frequented throughout their relationship.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  Of course, the fact that they “all were places the parties 
frequented throughout their relationship” supports the conclusion that Lundquist 
knew Charlene might go there and he went there for the purpose of stalking her, 
and Lundquist’s proffered explanations ignore the evidence that the contacts 
were not “coincidental.”  Charlene testified to the following incidents (not 
including the numerous electronic communications), which occurred after 
issuance of the protection order: 
 October 2013:  Charlene turned into her neighborhood on her way home 
from work and saw Lundquist parked on the street and, when he saw 
her, he “smiled and waved.”  (Tr., p.218, L.17 – p.219, L.10.) 
 October 30, 2013:  Charlene was at D&B Supply when she saw Lundquist 
“driving by super slow, just looking inside the store.”  (Tr., p.219, Ls.11-
19.) 
 November 30, 2013:  Charlene was at the 13th Street Pub, Lundquist 
came in and sat “in the bar where he could [see] her directly” and 
“stared” at her.  (Tr., p.225, L.17 – p.226, L.24.)  Charlene left the pub 
and went to O’Michael’s where she was involved in a “fender bender,” 
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that Lundquist later called and told her he saw.  (Tr., p.227, L.18 – p.230, 
L.16.) 
 September 5, 2014:  Charlene went to the 13th Street Pub, then Parrilla, 
and was going back to the car with her friend when she saw Lundquist 
walking around looking in the locations she had been.  (Tr., p.251, L.3 – 
p.255, L.24.)  Charlene decided to drive home and saw Lundquist 
following her in his car.  (Tr., p.256, L.1 – p.259, L.14.)   
That Lundquist offers alternative explanations for some of his behavior does 
not mean the jury had to accept those explanations, much less ignore the entirety 
of Lundquist’s behavior in concluding the state met its burden of proving a course 
of conduct. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607 (appellate court defers to 
the trier of fact with respect to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given 
to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence).   
   Finally, Lundquist complains the evidence was insufficient to support the 
jury’s determination that his conduct seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed 
Charlene, or that his conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial 
emotional distress.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-17.)  In support of this argument, 
Lundquist repeats there was a lack of any “threats” against Charlene.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  This argument fails for the same reason it failed when 
Lundquist first made it – there is no threat requirement necessary to convict a 
defendant of stalking under I.C. § 18-7906(a).  Rather, the only requirement is 
that Lundquist’s conduct seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed Charlene “and 
is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress.”  Id.  
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There is no question that Lundquist’s behavior alarmed, annoyed, and harassed 
Charlene – she testified as much.  Not only did Charlene specifically testify that 
she felt alarmed, annoyed, and harassed, she testified as to the measures she 
took as a result of Lundquist’s behavior, which included seeking a no contact 
order, changing her locks and garage code, adopting a dog, putting a trip wire in 
her courtyard, buying pepper spray, painting her garage windows shut, changing 
her parking place at work, changing churches, and going out less often.  (Tr., 
p.260, L.1 – p.264, L.16.)  That Lundquist does not think Charlene should have 
felt alarmed, annoyed, or harassed is irrelevant.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)    
 With respect to the requirement that his conduct would “cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress” (R., p.253), Lundquist argues 
“[n]o reasonable person would have been alarmed, annoyed, or harassed by the 
specific allegations elicited in this case” (Appellant’s Brief, p.15).  Twelve jurors 
disagreed.  Lundquist provides no basis for this Court to reject the jury’s 
determination in favor of his view of the evidence.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-17.)  
In fact, to do so would be contrary to law.  “Appellate review of the sufficiency of 
evidence is limited in scope.”  State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 177, 345 P.3d 
232, 236 (Ct. App. 2014).  The question is whether “there is substantial evidence 
upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution 
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” and the evidence is to be considered “in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution.”  Id. at 177-178, 345 P.3d at 236-237 (citations 
omitted).  “Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is 
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solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence.”  Id. at 178, 345 P.3d 
at 237.  “In fact, even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted 
consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty 
verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  There was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that Lundquist’s 
conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress.  
The evidence presented against Lundquist was more than sufficient to 
meet the state’s burden of proving every element of first-degree stalking.  The 
jury correctly concluded as much.  Lundquist has failed to meet his burden of 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Lundquist guilty of first-degree stalking. 
 DATED this 9th day of November, 2016. 
 
      __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello______ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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